

# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



## THESIS

**MANAGING MEANING: THE ROLE OF  
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND PUBLIC  
DIPLOMACY IN A NATIONAL INFORMATION  
WARFARE STRATEGY**

by

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December, 1995

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INFORMATION WARFARE STRATEGY**

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
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
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
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## **ABSTRACT**

Recent advances in both the speed and breadth of communications capabilities have drastically increased the value of Strategic Political Communications. The ability of individuals to gain exposure to information beyond the control of national authorities has greatly increased the level of public engagement in foreign relations and diplomacy. However, the much discussed "Information Revolution" is not limited to the technical advances achieved in the hardware of communications. Both Military Psychological Operations and Public Diplomacy are crucial to ensuring national strategic objectives are obtained by helping to shape international perceptions of the United States, its way of life, and its national interests.

The United States needs a national level agency tasked, and granted codified authority, to devise, coordinate and implement a National Information Strategy. A National Information Strategy will bolster the National Security Strategy by focusing the efforts of all agencies involved in disseminating information for the federal government. With an understanding of the role and power of information, this agency could provide the framework for an information campaign specifically targeted to the political-military situation of an emerging crisis.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. THE POWER OF INFORMATION

Over four centuries ago, Sir Francis Bacon wrote in his Religious Meditations, that "knowledge is itself power." Today, information has indeed joined the traditional three measures of a state's power - economics, military and political. The power of information is magnified by its ability to transcend traditional borders. As Walter Wriston noted in Foreign Affairs about the effects of information technology on borders, "lines on the maps, traditionally the cause of wars, are now porous" [Ref. 1]. Many states see the transborder flow of information as an attack on their sovereignty. In discussing the power of information in both "open" and "closed" societies, where the "open" polities are the conventional democracies, Philip Converse has noted that a state struggling to modernize may not be able to afford the luxury of "open" institutions because "open" institutions foster a level of public participation that the state may be too weak to handle [Ref. 2]. Conversely, the advent of cross-border communications provides a "closed" society with its own Hobson's dilemma. While the populace of a state has always received some exposure to ideas from external sources (such as traders, explorers and even wandering minstrels), it is the rapidity of the new electronic bombardment, and the government's inability to control its flow which poses a challenge to a state's sovereignty. In fact, the Marxist-Leninist states of this century have been based primarily on their governments' ability to monopolize and manipulate information. Allowing its citizens access to computers and data bases will obviously loosen the state's control over the populace. A key to understanding the information revolution lies in accepting "information" as a new source of power. The role of information as a source of power has been recognized by international alliances and regimes.



International institutions and agreements, like the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have all been modified to deal with 'a world economy that is more and more driven by flows of information'" [Ref. 3].

Wriston notes that the idea of a nation-state was based on the concept of territoriality. The information revolution, according to Wriston, is causing a shift in the tectonic plates of national power and sovereignty. While improved access to information may lead to a more level playing field between weaker, smaller states, and the larger, stronger ones, it may also lead to a more invidious form of cultural imperialism. It is the rapidity of the information flow which allows an unprecedented exchange of information and values between states.

## **B. INFORMATION WARFARE**

The recent advances of the technological revolution have altered the tempo and characteristics of international communications. Kenneth Thompson noted that "before the twentieth century, ministers with their experts planned diplomatic measures with some thought for the legislative assembly, little for the people, and none at all for Gallup polls" [Ref. 4]. Today, the Zapatista Liberation Army in Mexico's state of Chiapas is on-line with its own homepage on the internet while subcommandante Marcos is said to use a laptop computer to communicate with his guerrillaforces throughout the jungle. During the 1989 democracy movement in China, protesters surrounded by the Chinese Army in Tiananmen Square sent and received fax transmissions. These transmissions kept the world apprised of the situation in China, while also letting the students know they were receiving international support for their cause. The explosion in the scope of communications, both in breadth and speed, has led to

more public engagement in foreign relations and diplomacy than at any time in history. As President, Ronald Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 130 which states in part:

International information is an integral and vital part of US national security policy and strategy in the broad sense. Together with other components of public diplomacy, it is a key strategic instrument for shaping fundamental political and ideological trends around the globe on a long-term basis and ultimately affecting the behavior of governments.

This rapid expansion of the technological capabilities has been described by many as an "information revolution." While there have been several studies about the potentialities of the technical capabilities now possible through satellites, computers and radios, many researchers looking into potential applications of this emerging realm of conflict have overlooked the "soft" side of the revolution. Today, the ability to beam (as opposed to broadcast) radio and television signals anywhere in the world has made it possible for one people not only to take part in another's domestic political discourse, but to influence and manipulate the dialogue. The value of this capability lies in the ability to invade and manipulate the information/decision cycle of enemies, potential adversaries and allies. The information revolution is not limited to the hardware which can be used. It also involves a "social, political, economic, cultural, and psychological, as well as technological revolution" [Ref. 5].

In their book, War and Anti-War, authors Alvin and Heidi Toffler refer to the coming "knowledge" wars. Quoting Pentagon sources, the Tofflers define "knowledge warfare" as conflict wherein each side tries to shape enemy actions by manipulating the flow of intelligence and information. They recognize that any organization, whether military or civilian, must perform four functions with respect to information. An organization must acquire, process, distribute and protect information, all the while denying the same actions to their adversary. It is in relation to these four functions that a well coordinated strategic information campaign can

benefit the US foreign policy posture. An information campaign should be designed to invade and manipulate the flow of information in either any one of the four functions, or in all four simultaneously.

Within the Department of Defense, the pending revision to the pertinent directive defines Information Warfare as:

Actions taken to achieve superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, and information systems, while defending one's own information, information-based processes, and information systems.

The directive further defines information as facts, data or instructions in any medium or form.

An Information System consists of "the entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display and act on information." [Ref. 6] Most in the military have become familiar with the phrase "Command and Control Warfare (C2W)." C2W is the military strategy which implements information warfare with the objective of decapitating the enemy's command structure. C2W revolves around those tactical, operational and strategic actions which occur during an actual conflict [Ref. 7]. Information warfare, on the other hand, is an ongoing endeavor which takes place during times of peace, as well as the pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict periods of international diplomatic relations. In coining the phrase "Netwar," authors John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt explained that information related conflict, at a grand scale between nations, entails the attempt to disrupt or modify what a target population knows or thinks it knows about its environs [Ref. 8]. Additionally, they note that success in a "cyberwar" requires the rapid flow of information, as well as its rapid processing. Power is wielded by the side that can better manage its flow of information.

## C. COORDINATING THE MESSAGE

Writing in 1989 about political warfare, Angelo Codevilla noted that soon it would be possible to invade the political dialogue of other states. He then asked, "but what messages do we wish to send? And to what end?" [Ref. 9 ] At this time of decreasing budgets, limited forward presence of military forces, slashed force structures, fiscal austerity and resource scarcity, a viable national security program requires the ability to wage and win an effective information campaign. The "information war" is an ongoing endeavor waged throughout times of peace, during crises and conflicts. The history of US attempts to "win the hearts and minds" has most often been bereft of a coordinating, national level strategy. This has allowed various actors in the foreign affairs arena to conduct their own operations of persuasion - sometimes at the risk of nullifying another US agency's information campaign.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the need for a national level agency to coordinate strategic international communications. Specifically, strategic coordination will ensure that the appropriate message is formulated to achieve national goals. First, this paper will analyze the role that message content must play in a national-level information strategy. The preponderance of literature on the Information Revolution is rife with discussion of its technological aspects. While the tools of image management have evolved over the centuries, what has remained constant is the necessity to construct a message that accomplishes your objectives. In the emerging doctrine of Information Warfare, constructing the appropriate message is the function of both military psychological operations and public diplomacy. The tasks of target audience selection and message construction to effect target perceptions will be reviewed in relation to strategic communications. Secondly, in proposing the establishment of an agency for strategic

level coordination of information assets, I will review recent communications operations during US efforts in Haiti and Somalia emphasizing the operations' contrasts in regards to interagency information coordination.

## **II. THE ART OF PERSUASION**

### **A. DEFINING THE FUTURE**

Whether in statecraft or war, the objective is always an image of the future. The goal is to devise plans that use all available tools of mass communications to motivate specific action on the part of the targeted decision-makers. In attempting to manipulate a decision-maker, or his decision-making process, we are attempting to have the target itself redefine the situation in such a way as to motivate action favorable to our goal. The motives for managing perceptions have remained constant throughout history. These motives include mobilizing support for your cause (both domestically and internationally), legitimizing your objectives while delegitimizing your opponents' objectives, contrasting the potency of your forces against the impotence of your adversary's forces, and ultimately, to define the circumstances of the crisis in terms favorable to your objectives.

### **B. REDEFINING THE SITUATION**

There are two methods to help a target redefine his situation. Either the material, physical situation can be modified, or the target's perception of the situation can be modified. A state alarmed by the buildup of troops along its border will be assuaged by either the actual removal of the troops or by being convinced that the troops along its border are not a threat (the key being that the state must be "convinced"). The same two methods may apply to the internal matters of a foreign decision-maker. We can either materially affect the conditions within a state by granting such items as financial assistance, trade concessions and humanitarian aid, or we can affect his perception of some aspect of his own state that bears on his choices and decisions. Each of the approaches is designed to motivate the decision-maker in favor of our goals by

changing his view of his world, either in reality or perception. Even the manipulation of the material world will affect an individual's perception because he will now have a new "view" of his world.

The methods for accomplishing this task are varied and have been extensively dissected. In their book, the Tofflers have identified six common practices of military propagandists over the years. These six are; the atrocity accusation; hyperbolic inflation of the stakes involved; demonization or dehumanization of the opponent; polarization; divine sanction; and finally, metapropaganda, or discrediting the other sides propaganda. [Ref. 10] These however, are merely possible themes which can be used to exploit prejudices. They are not techniques of manipulation for the purpose of persuasive communications. The most succinct breakdown of communications techniques has been provided by authors Robert Holt and Robert van de Velde. They identified the available techniques as propaganda, rumor, direct person-to-person communication, and symbolic acts. They further identified deception, enlightenment, terror and reassurance as the tactics of strategic psychological operations doctrine. [Ref. 11]

### **C. PROPAGANDA**

Originally the name of the department of the Vatican that had the responsibility of propagating the faith, *Propaganda* has acquired a plethora of definitions, most with negative connotations. In its most broad definition, it has been written that:

Propaganda consists of the planned use of any form of public or mass-produced communications designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given group for a specific purpose, whether military, economical or political. [Ref. 12 ]

In its pristine form, that of disseminating ideas and information, there is no problem with the term propaganda. The many pejorative connotations arose from the practices of the Soviet Union during the 1920s and of Nazi Germany's Propaganda Ministry. In both cases propaganda became

synonymous with the spread of untruths, hate, and distortions. Any definition of propaganda must address three key aspects. First is the issue of a mass audience. Propaganda is not the result of one-on-one or inter-personal communications. Mass communications are aimed at a mass audience (not, however, an untargeted audience). While it is possible to select specific groups for mass communications, "the audience is mass in the sense that there can be no discrimination between individuals who may make it up." [Ref. 13] Secondly, the definition of propaganda must address the attempt to influence behavior in a specific manner. Influencing the behavior of decision-makers, even in a totalitarian state, may be accomplished by affecting the opinions of the masses or select groups within the population which may have an effect on the decision-makers or their decision-making process. Lastly, a definition of propaganda must point out that the tools of propaganda are merely methodologies without moral connotations. Propaganda attempts to affect manner. In doing so, it attempts to represent reality in such a manner as to bring peoples' perceptions in line with the propagandist's.

Propaganda may be broken down into different subcategories. Direct and indirect propaganda relate to either a direct appeal for action or the indirect appeal for institutional awareness. Direct propaganda requests a directed action: smoke brand X. Indirect, or institutional propaganda attempts to convey an institution's integrity and honesty: sponsorship of youth activities by major corporations. Propaganda can also be subdivided by the acknowledgment of the source. In relation to the identification of its source, propaganda may range from White Propaganda (overt acknowledgment of the true source), through Gray Propaganda (source not clearly identified) to Black Propaganda (covert operation that purports to emanate from sources other than the true source). [Ref. 14] Additionally, but not lastly,



propaganda may be subdivided between Strategic Propaganda designed in coordination with strategic plans to effect results over an extended period, or Tactical Propaganda prepared and executed in support of local combat operations.

#### **D. RUMOR**

Another technique of persuasive communications is the use of rumor. Rumor has been defined as a "specific (or topical) proposition for belief, passed along from person to person, usually by word of mouth, without secure standards of evidence being present." [Ref. 15] The uniqueness of rumor lies in the fact that passed from person to person, it is constantly filtered through personal perceptions with each telling. While some details may be eliminated with each telling, even important details, those that remain become sharpened with each telling leading to a more concise story.

#### **E. INTER-PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS**

The advent of mass communications with its tremendous advances in technological capabilities has not negated the fact that the most effective form of persuasive communications remains direct, face-to-face communication. As in propaganda, face-to-face communication can be either direct or indirect. While diplomats on foreign soil may practice direct face-to-face communications in the practice of statecraft, indirect communications are served by such programs as student exchanges, artistic performances, and other forms of cultural intercourse.

#### **F. THE SYMBOLIC ACT**

The final technique of persuasive communications is the symbolic act. Also known as propaganda of the deed, these actions may be more important for the meaning they convey than for their physical effect. The very existence of an underground movement may say more about

the control of the state authority than any actual missions they may carry out. Also, the presence of police properly equipped and trained for crowd control may do more to preclude a riot than the physical security measures they undertake. Like the other techniques discussed above, physical operations can affect changes in the apparent world.

## **G. THE TACTICS OF COMMUNICATIONS**

In attempting to use the different techniques that may affect persuasive communications, planning for psychological operations on any level requires an understanding of the tactics available.

### **1. Deception**

Deception attempts to create a psychological environment different from the actual environment. For deception to be successful it must first be reasonable. The deception must be such that a rational individual could see how it may be true. Secondly, successful deception requires that there be no simple method for the target to corroborate the facts. Finally, deception should not compromise a source that may have future value. Holt and van de Velde point out that deception is usually discovered eventually and that the more successful the deception the more likely it is that the source will be discredited.

### **2. Enlightenment**

The tactic of enlightenment is also known as the strategy of truth. "Its potency derives from the fact that dire consequences may result for an individual if his world of meaning differs very greatly from the material world." [Ref. 16] Modern man is much more dependent on unknown and distant people to bring him knowledge. Accordingly, the party that can provide the most accurate information may have more control over a target's behavior. For truth to enlighten

requires a thorough analysis of how the listener interprets the information and translates it into action.

### **3. Terror**

The effective use of the tactic of terror is predicated on unpredictable physical violence. Either implicitly or explicitly, terror conveys a threat. The violence must be unpredictable to hold all the community at bay; violence discerned to have a pattern will affect only those who are seen to fit into the pattern. There are, of course, varying degrees of terror, particularly in democratic societies. However, in a world ruled by power politics, even democracies may wish to rely on fear to coerce adversaries rather than risk all-out conventional war.

### **4. Reassurance**

The last tactic of persuasive communications, reassurance, is considered the opposite of terror. Behavior may be affected not by inducing fear through terror, but rather by reducing fear through reassurance. Reassurance may be aimed at unreal, perceived threats, or at actual physical threats. In the first case psychological operations would be aimed at changing the perception towards reducing the fear. In the latter instance, psychological operations must be coordinated with operations designed to physically remove or neutralize the cause of fear.

## **H. LIMITATIONS**

Having listed the techniques and tactics available for use in psychological operations, it must be understood that while a good doctrine will encompass portions of each, there will also be limitations to their use, particularly in a democratic society. A primary limit placed on operations is lack of manpower or material resources (limited material resources complicated the transfer of communications responsibilities between the UNITAF and UNOSOM II forces in

Somalia). In discussing strategic psychological operations it is an assumption that any agency tasked with the mission will not have enough resources to conduct operations in every country and with every audience that should be targeted. Accordingly, policy decisions are required as to where to expend the scarce resources based on the current needs of the state. There are material limitations that may affect psychological operations. Material limitations may be of personnel or equipment or they may be technical limitations. A programmed operation may be hindered by the lack of linguists in the necessary language or by the lack of analysts knowledgeable of the targeted culture. Holt and van de Velde point out that during rapid mobilization, practitioners of psychological warfare may find themselves competing for limited electronic equipment with military operators.

Cultural constraints may be another type of restriction, particularly in democratic societies. With their emphasis on the intrinsic value of an individual, short of an all-out war of annihilation, many democratic states would not condone the use of deception and most would not allow the use of terror even against an opponent. Another form of cultural limitation is the danger of projecting one's beliefs on the rest of the world. Such a pitfall exists when Americans see a trend towards democracy and freedom throughout the world despite the emerging conflicts of race, ethnicity and religion. "The American tendency to emphasize propaganda campaigns to wholesale rather than elite audiences might well be based on such a confusion. The peculiar (often mystical) power that Americans seem to place on "truth" as a weapon in the Cold War also appears to be based not on rigorous, empirical analyses of the use of this tactic but on our value orientations." [Ref. 17]

Finally, political limitations, particularly in a country like the United States, also contribute to the reluctance to conduct psychological operations. The very fact that there exists a separation of powers within the government creates built-in friction in the system. Debate over the conduct and funding of psychological operations contain some inherent conflicts. E. W. Barret, in Truth is Our Weapon, lists three specific causes of political limitations inherent in democratic states:

1. Public debate may mitigate the value of psychological operations. It may provide warning to an adversary or embarrassment to a friend.
2. Most politicians do not understand the intricacies of psychological operations. Debate among politicians is usually uninformed and therefore often dangerous.
3. Psychological operations do not lend themselves to simple cost-benefit calculations. Effectiveness is often subtle and may not materialize for years. Even successful operations may not be apparent to all observers.

## **I. AUDIENCE SELECTION**

Appropriate use of the techniques and tactics available for persuasive communications requires that the proper audience be targeted for the message. Having noted the limitations that affect the practice of psychological operations, an analysis of the various audiences is required to preclude a wasteful approach. A historic dialogue over whether to target the masses or the elite is almost a moot point since the resources for mass communications targeted to an entire country almost never exist. However, for a national-level, strategic operation, mass communications are often unnecessary since "only segments of a country's population take an interest in, and have influence over, their government's policies." [Ref. 18] Targeting the general population usually serves tactical measures much better than strategic objectives. Having analyzed the internal and external methods available to affect decision-makers, it becomes apparent that each course may involve different potential audiences. An analysis of potential audiences should reveal exactly who in the society should be targeted for manipulation. Potential targets of information campaigns may include the national leadership, the military leadership, the armed forces, civil

populations, external sources of target nation support and our allies and international organizations. Each of these potential targets should not be approached separately, but rather, integrated into a national-level, strategic political communications campaign. The campaign must incorporate the objectives, plans, requirements and approaches necessary to accomplish the established goals.

Within each of these potential targets there exist key decision makers, or gatekeepers, who can sway the opinion of others. The initial step requires the identification of the opinion leaders of the society - the gatekeepers who mediate for their peer groups. Gatekeepers facilitate the transmission of messages, either favorably or unfavorably, within their group. Two criteria have been established for the selection of target audiences. First, the *susceptibility* of the audience to being influenced in the desired manner must be established. Secondly, the *cruciality* of the audience to the targeted decision-making process must be confirmed.

### **1. Susceptibility**

Holt and van de Velde point out that "man is not a cork adrift on a stormy ocean of propaganda, yielding passively to the strongest and most persistent currents" [Ref. 19]. To understand the degree of susceptibility, a planner must understand how prospective recipients will filter the messages they receive. These filters refer to the variables that intervene between the receipt of a message and the response to that message. Current social science has identified these variables as being either societal variables, that stem from the social structure of the target audience, or psychological variables that arise from the personality characteristics of the various individuals in the audience. Both societal and psychological variables must be analyzed in determining the susceptibility of an audience to a proposed message.

### ***a. Societal Variables***

The primary societal variables are the means of communications themselves within the society. Channels of communications may not be as open to the target audience in all societies, particularly under totalitarian governments. Additionally, different groups in a society may respond to, and utilize, different channels of communications. The channels of communications available to a citizen in a metropolitan area are probably quite different from those available to a member of a rural, tribal village. Even within a given group, social status will affect how communications are received. Different individuals within the group may utilize different gatekeepers to transmit and interpret messages for them. Importantly, evidence suggests that private attitudes that may belong to an individual, are in fact developed, supported and maintained in conjunction with a small group of peers with whom he interacts [Ref. 20].

### ***b. Psychological Variables***

Psychological variables are those which affect the way an individual may interpret the meaning of a message. An individual's, or an audience's, attitude affects how a message is perceived and therefore may have to be altered to motivate the desired response. The process of perception may be affected by omission, supplementation, or structuring. [Ref. 21] Omission refers to the effect whereby certain objects or parts of the message may not be perceived. Supplementing is similar to the theory of closure where individuals tend to "round out" an image to make it complete in their mind. Finally, structuring refers to the practice where certain parts of a message may be highlighted while others are dimmed. All three practices are tools used by an individual to package a message in such a way that it will make sense to him in relation to his life experiences.

### *c. The Messenger*

Another way in which an individual's, or audience's, attitude may affect receipt of a message deals with the perceived credibility of the communicator of the message. In Communication and Persuasion, authors Hovland, Janis and Kelley identify two factors in this process: (1) the extent to which a communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions (his expertise) and (2) the degree of confidence in the communicator's attempt to communicate what he considers to be valid assertions (his trustworthiness). The authors' research reveals the effects of source-credibility on the acceptance of the message as follows:

1. Communications attributed to low credibility sources tend to be considered more biased and unfair in presentations than identical ones attributed to high credibility sources.
2. High credibility sources had a substantially greater immediate effect on the audience's opinions than low credibility sources.
3. The effects on opinion were not the results of differences in the amount of attention or comprehension.
4. The positive effect of high credibility sources and the negative effect of the low credibility sources tended to disappear after a period of several weeks. [Ref. 22]

### **2. Cruciality**

Again, a foreign policy strategy must be aimed at a desired goal; to motivate a decision-maker to a specific action. Psychological operations aimed at a susceptible audience, which possesses no influence over the decision-making process would be wasted. Determining cruciality entails ranking potential audiences on the basis of their influence over the decision-making process. Complete cruciality ranking may be nearly impossible. Different groups may have influence over different issues, and at different times. A certain group may only have interest in certain issues, or its access to other issues may be limited. Additionally, because decision-making is a process, different individuals or audiences may exert influence on a single issue, but at different points along the process (in terms of a democracy such as the US, influence may be exerted on a



policy issue when it is introduced to the legislative body, when it goes to the executive for ratification, when it is applied in the public domain, or later, should it be challenged in the judiciary).

## **J. THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER**

All these issues of manipulating the perceptions of individuals conjures the negative images of propaganda. It must be reiterated that propaganda is an art that bears no moral connotation.

Psychological operations also are not *a priori* "subversive" or necessarily covert. Rather they are directed at providing audiences with specific information about situations and policies affecting them which they would not be able to obtain thorough their own government or country's informational sources. [Ref. 23]

Like any weapon, psychological operations can be wielded by men with virtuous as well as evil intentions. In defending the use of political warfare and psychological operations Fred Ikle reminds us that both "methods are by no means inescapably in conflict with the moral requirements of modern democratic government" [Ref. 24]. The base of democracy's strength is its respect for the individual and the truth. Those planners of psychological operations who have internalized the morality of democracy are better prepared to counter the disinformation of a morally bankrupt adversary. "The goals of democracy can only be accomplished with methods that are compatible with democracy" [Ref. 25].

### III. STRATEGIC POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS

#### A. DEFINING THE ART

The first dilemma in attempting to construct a framework for operations of persuasion is to differentiate between competing terms and definitions. Particularly since the end of World War II, such terms as Psychological Operations, Public Diplomacy, Psychological Warfare and Propaganda have been used interchangeably. Like the practice itself, each term connotes different meanings to different actors. An attempt to coalesce the various facets of the practice, as well as to incorporate the various levels of its applicability, was provided by the phrase *Strategic Psychological Operations*. Coined by Holt and van de Velde in 1960, the term implies the large-scale, continuous process that encompasses the functions of planning, coordinating, directing and acting. Additionally, the term conveys the organizational and geographical scope of activities [Ref. 26]. However, a more exacting term, and one not burdened with the negative connotations of "psychological operations," has been constructed by Jarol Manheim. Manheim uses *Strategic Political Communications* to describe the

use of sophisticated knowledge of such attributes of human behavior as attitude and preference structures, cultural tendencies, and media-use patterns - as well as knowledge of such relevant organizational behaviors as how news organizations make decisions regarding news content and how congressional committees schedule and structure hearings - to shape and target messages so as to maximize their desired impact while minimizing undesired collateral effects. [Ref. 27]

Regardless, the basis for all the terms used is the attempt to manipulate how objects and events are perceived. What distinguishes public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy is its attempt to influence how objects and actions are perceived and interpreted. While secrecy and privacy are often required for the practice of traditional statecraft, publicity, the exposure to the masses, is inherent in public diplomacy. What distinguishes psychological warfare from conventional

warfare is its attempt to win military gains without military force. Where traditional diplomacy and military operations deal with the manipulation of material objects (trade concessions, transfers of funds, destruction of means to wage war, etc.), psychological operations and public diplomacy are concerned with how objects and events may be perceived by a particular audience. In these matters Holt and van de Velde distinguish between the realms of the material world and the apparent world. Similarly, Jarol Manheim has pointed out that as the art of managing conflict has evolved, so too has the art of managing the images of that conflict.

## **B. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

While cases of psychological operations have been recorded throughout history (the Bible says Gideon deceived the Midianites as to his true strength in 1245 BC. by exhibiting more lamps than would traditionally be carried by a force the size of his), they have become particularly important in recent decades. The rapid evolution in communications has increased the value of what has often been interchangeably termed Political Warfare or Psychological Operations. The Department of Defense document implementing the concept of Command and Control Warfare defines military psychological operations as:

planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. [Ref. 28]

Most Americans believe that the role of the armed forces is to fight and win the state's wars. A better definition must include the understanding that the true role of the armed forces lies in their value as an instrument to deter wars. Deterrence is a psychological phenomenon. Effective deterrence is the result of managed perceptions. To manage perceptions information must be managed. Paul Huth has defined deterrence as a policy, backed by the threat of military

retaliations, which attempts to persuade an adversary that the costs of engaging in military actions will outweigh the benefits [Ref. 29]. Huth further explains that any windows of vulnerability or opportunity perceived by the attacker can threaten the success of deterrence during a crisis. In both these statements the key to success or failure rests on perceptions. In their article on cyberwar, Arquilla and Ronfeldt note that deterrence may become as much a function of a state's cyber posture and presence as their force posture and presence. The ability to manipulate the perceptions of a potential adversary becomes crucial to successful deterrence. As noted by Sun Tzu centuries ago, the acme of military skill lies in the ability to subdue the enemy without having to fight. This is no less true today than it was centuries ago. To accomplish this goal, we must be able to both control and manipulate the enemy's flow of information.

At a time of decreasing deployments, declining force structures, intermittent presence overseas, reduced security assistance, and growing demands on US engagement, PSYOP is more important than ever. ... PSYOP plays an indirect role by focusing the efforts of the US Government - as well as allies, friends, and international organizations - on defusing crises, containing conflicts, or if deterrence fails, defeating an enemy in the shortest time with the least loss of life. [Ref. 30]

The conflicting ideals of the cold war, compounded by ever increasing constraints on the resources for prosecuting conventional wars have increased the value of gaining strategic goals without having to resort to physical coercion. Until the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the military parity between the superpowers also enhanced the value of war by persuasion. The cold war was, in fact, fought with information and images.

"The 'hot' wars of the past used weapons that knocked off the enemy, one by one. Even ideological warfare in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries proceeded by persuading individuals to adopt new points of view, one at a time. Electric persuasion by photo and movie and TV works, instead, by dunking entire populations in new imagery" [Ref. 31].

Today however, national strategic goals are more likely to be contested in the political realms of insurgency and low intensity conflict. Both types of military conflicts are tightly intertwined with international and in-country public opinion and the ability to persuade masses of people.

However, all military actions short of wars of extinction, have as their goals to affect a psychological change in an opponent (the "continuation of politics by other means").

Clausewitz' dictum, writes Fred Ikle, has been turned on its head. Today, "international politics is the continuation of war by other means" [Ref. 32 ].

### **C. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY**

While often credited with the creation of strategic diplomatic communications, Machiavelli's The Prince actually detailed practices which had gone on for centuries. In writing of Strategic Public Diplomacy, Jarol Manheim lists the practices of Richard I of England during his Crusades against Saladin, and Vlad the Impaler (inspiration for the legends of Dracula) as two practitioners of strategic political communications who predated Machiavelli. [Ref. 33] In their endeavors to communicate with the leaders and the people of other lands, governments have recognized the value of public diplomacy. During the American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln penned an open letter to the people of England explaining the North's position. Cultural exchanges designed to explain government policies to foreign audiences and efforts to influence public or elite opinion in a foreign state are both types of public diplomacy. Early in this century both types of public diplomacy were considered propaganda and distinct from the traditional forms of diplomacy (as in the exchange of formal messages between states and the individual-level "personal" diplomacy between those involved in diplomatic contacts).

The term public diplomacy was coined in 1965 by Edmund Guillon of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Its definition was recorded as:

...a government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies [Ref. 34]

In reference to the psychological dimensions of a national strategy, public diplomacy has been described as encompassing three distinct functions: international information; international political action (or overt political warfare); and public affairs [Ref. 35]. The Voice of America, established in 1942 to counteract Nazi propaganda and the many overseas libraries maintained by the US Information Agency (USIA) now engage in public diplomacy as do participants in the Fulbright Exchange programs. Manheim describes strategic public diplomacy as "the practice of propaganda in the earliest sense of the term, but enlightened by half a century of empirical research into human motivation and behavior" [Ref. 36]. Today, the mission falls to USIA, established in 1953, to present the American case abroad. Throughout its existence, USIA's mission has evolved and its very *raison d'etre* has been regularly questioned.

The entry of the US into the First World War also saw the creation of the government's first official office of propaganda. President Wilson appointed George Creel, a journalist, to head the newly established Committee of Public Information. Because its very narrow mandate was to inform the world of the US war aims, the office was immediately abolished in 1919. During the 1920s the propaganda programs of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany posed little threat to the US. However, as the European crisis increased, President Roosevelt responded to the spreading Axis propaganda by creating an Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific Cooperation and a Division of Cultural Cooperation within the State Department thus beginning cultural relations

with foreign states. With the advent of World War II, Roosevelt established the Agency of Foreign Intelligence and Propaganda. Most of this organization was later subsumed by the Office of War Information (OWI). With the demise of the Agency of Foreign Intelligence and Propaganda, the term propaganda would never be used again by any agency of the US. Distinct policy kept information and cultural programs separate, with information aimed at enemy and occupied territories and cultural or educational programs directed toward neutral areas. In the post-war dismantling of war agencies, OWI was terminated along with other agencies.

The advent of the cold War led President Truman to create the Office of Information and Cultural Affairs within the Department of State. Calling for a "dignified information program, as distinguished from propaganda," the Undersecretary for Public and Cultural Affairs revealed his plan "to see to it that other peoples receive a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the US government." [Ref. 37] This was the first peacetime program of informational and cultural affairs.

The general state of world affairs and the growing anti-Communist sentiment in the US led to Truman's call for a "Campaign of Truth." Following North Korea's invasion of South Korea, Congress drastically increased funding for international information programs and the National Security Council defined the primary mission of information programs as the deterrence of the Soviet war effort. Responsibility for overseas information as well as educational exchange programs, was now vested in the US International Information Administration (IIA), a semi-autonomous unit within the Department of State. IIA remained operative until August 1953 when the USIA was created.

The creation of USIA was embroiled in the election year politics of 1952. Senator McCarthy's Committee on Government Operations had placed IIA under investigation and caused the resignation of the recently appointed director, Robert L. Jackson. Throughout 1952, no less than six studies were conducted on US information and cultural programs. One such study, the Mark May Report, recommended that a new Cabinet level agency be established "in which there is vested authority to formulate psychological strategy and to coordinate information policies of all Government agencies and consolidate all overseas information programs [Ref. 38]. This recommendation was mirrored in April 1953 by the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organizations, which had been established by President Eisenhower upon his inauguration. President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan #8 created the United States Information Agency.

Throughout its existence, USIA would be subjected to continued reviews and studies about its organization, status as an independent agency, and its proper mission. During the 1960s, the emphasis of the agency's mission would shift between information and explanation. The turmoil continued during the 1970s when, in 1978, President Carter created the International Communications Agency. In a memorandum to USIA director John Reinhardt President Carter stated, in part, "It is in the general interest of the community of nations, as well as in our own interest, that other nations and other peoples know where this great country stands, and why" [Ref. 39]. This statement emphasizes the role of strategic psychological operations: bringing other people's view of the world into focus with ours. In August 1982, the name reverted to US Information Agency. In an attempt to prevent USIA from becoming an internal propaganda



force, legislation has been written that prevents the agency from disseminating information and media products within the United States.

According to Cynthia Efird, Senior Advisor to the Director of USIA on Trade and Economics, under the current administration, USIA has had its budget cut along with the other agencies involved in foreign affairs. To accommodate these cuts, USIA has been forced to eliminate certain programs and to leave interagency billets unstaffed. In particular, the liaison position at Fort Bragg which coordinated with military PSYOP and Civil Affairs planners has remained unfilled. Today, the agency remains embroiled in controversy. North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms has threatened to hold foreign policy appropriations hostage until the administration agrees to his plans for the restructuring of the foreign policy apparatus. Included in his vision of a future foreign policy organization is the abolition of the US Information Agency and its mission turned over to the traditional diplomats within the Department of State. Such a proposal reflects the depths of ignorance, even among holders of key policy positions, about the differences between traditional and public diplomacy. Senator Helms and his advisors need to review John Lee's 1968 book, The Diplomatic Persuaders, in which the author succinctly states,

It is no longer possible for high-level statesmen to glide through the lofty avenues of diplomacy, trailed by first, second, and third secretaries in perfect protocol alignment. A government to survive must supplement formal government-to-government relations with an approach to the people ... The is the age of public diplomacy ... International opinion wields incredible power , and we must inform the people of other nations ... allies, and enemies alike. The government that fails to do so may find itself inarticulate in the face of world opinion. [Ref. 40]

#### **D. STRATEGIC COORDINATION**

One element of strategic political communications which many analysts and practitioners have called for is better coordination of the strategic message between the various branches of the government. As stated above, the 1953 Mark May Report recommended that the newly

established IIA be vested with the authority to coordinate information policies of all government agencies. During the transition to the Kennedy administration, various task forces studied the foreign policy apparatus of the US. Lloyd Free of USIA and W. Philip Davison of the Rand Corporation headed the task force to review procedures at USIA. The Free-Davison Task Force also called for greater coordination of psychological objectives. In particular, the Free-Davison report recommended that such a committee be established under the National Security Council.

The on-rush of the information revolution increases the need for interagency coordination. In executing the nation's foreign policy goals, information covers a greater spectrum than ever before.

The information complex includes tactical, operational and strategic military information, information gleaned through national intelligence systems including communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, human intelligence and measurement intelligence; economic financial and demographic data, public opinion and public communication data. [Ref. 41]

Perhaps more than most recent national leaders, President Reagan saw the value of a strong, proactive national information strategy. Under Reagan, a new committee was established under the Chairmanship of USIA to coordinate information policy between the various agencies involved in foreign affairs, to include the Defense Department. With the signing of National Security Decision Directive #77 on January 14, 1983, the President recognized the necessity "to strengthen the organization, planning and coordination of the various aspects of public diplomacy of the United States Government relative to national security." [Ref. 42]

Accordingly, NSDD-77 established a Special Planning Group under the National Security Council which consisted of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of USIA, Director of the Agency for International Development and the Assistant to the President for Communications. The Special

Planning Group was tasked with responsibility for overall planning, direction, coordination and monitoring of all public diplomacy activities. Additionally, four interagency standing committees were established to report regularly to the Special Planning Group. The four committees were the Public Affairs Committee, the International Information Committee, the International Political Committee and the International Broadcasting Committee. Lastly, NSDD-77 tasked all agencies to ensure that necessary resources were made available for the effective operation of the interagency groups. Under the authority of NSDD-77, major public diplomacy campaigns were conducted to promote administration policies in Latin America and in the general area of defense and arms control. Despite the bold step of NSDD-77, General Richard Stilwell, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Undersecretary for Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has noted that the Directive failed to include the Central Intelligence Agency and made no provision for input from, nor interface with, the intelligence community. [Ref. 43]

The strong commitment to political communications was viewed by some as a contributing factor in the abuses of the Iran-Contra affair. It has been claimed that the Reagan administration began to blur the codified distinction between foreign and domestic information programs. Therefore, under the Bush administration, the National Security Council did not fill the positions dedicated to information policy, and both the State and Defense Departments abolished positions previously established for USIA liaisons. USIA, for its part, returned to its traditional practices of personal interaction, face-to-face diplomacy, distributing materials and policy statements, and overseas radio and television broadcasts.

## **IV. THE ART IN PRACTICE**

### **A. RECENT OPERATIONS**

In reviewing the operations conducted in Somalia and Haiti, it is readily recognized that there are many cultural and environmental differences between the two nations. Also, the motivations for US involvement were dramatically different. However, there are also many similarities which allow these cases to be selected for the purposes of this paper. While both operations were undertaken under the rubric of the United Nations, both operations began, in fact, as US led with only enough coalition support to mollify domestic and international opinions. Both operations were initiated for ostensibly humanitarian reasons (although in the case of Haiti the tide of refugees arriving in Florida was a major issue of domestic immigration policy). Lastly, both operations were conceived as short duration endeavors with the US providing the necessary initial stability to enable UN Multinational Forces to arrive and assume their mandated role. However, for the purposes of this paper, the value of the two cases revolves around the execution of the information management campaign. In particular, the amount of planned interagency coordination and the level, or lack of, strategic guidance received.

### **B. SOMALIA**

Kenneth Allard, in writing about the lessons learned during recent operations in Somalia, noted that between 1945 and 1987 there were thirteen peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations. However, that number was matched between 1987 and 1992. [Ref. 44] Despite the paradigm shifting precedent established by UN Resolution 688, which authorized intervention in sovereign states for urgent humanitarian needs, the UN was initially powerless in Somalia due to Mohamed Aideed's refusal to accept UN peacekeepers. Former Assistant

Secretary of State for International Organizations, John Bolton, has written that, at the time, the UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, followed standard peacekeeping procedures, "no 'blue helmets' would be deployed unless all parties consented" [Ref. 45].

Amid constant reports of mass starvation, the Bush administration offered to deploy up to 30,000 troops (to include forces from other nations). The President's proposal called for an American-led operation limited in mandate, time and geographical scope. The mission would be launched to secure key ports, airports, roads and aid distribution centers in central and southern Somalia. The mission's goal was to stabilize the military situation only to the extent needed to avert mass starvation. Additionally, the expectation was that the mission would be passed to the United Nations within no more than four months. Despite a staunch campaign on the part of the UN secretary-general that the coalition disarm the Somali factions before handing the operation back to the UN, the Security Council requested that the secretary-general submit a plan within 15 days for turning the operations over to the United Nations. To further ensure that there be no misunderstanding between the US objectives and the UN secretary-general's wishes, President Bush wrote to the secretary-general:

I want to emphasize that the mission of the coalition is limited and specific: to create security conditions which will permit the feeding of the starving Somali people and allow the transfer of this security function to the UN peacekeeping force ... objectives can, and should, be met in the near term. As soon as they are, the coalition force will depart from Somalia transferring its security function to your UN peacekeeping force. [Ref. 46]

In a return letter to President Bush, the secretary-general not only repeated his desires that the coalition forces disarm all Somali factions, but also that they defuse all mines in the country, set up a civil administration and begin training police. The inability to devise an agreed upon

strategic plan for military operations in Somalia, transcended all aspects of the operations. It was particularly crucial in the absence of any strategic coordination of the information war.

Because of the dearth of guidance emanating from New York and Washington, information officers on the ground received their policy guidance from the collaboration between Ambassador Robert Oakley and Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, US Marine Corps. According to Lieutenant Colonel Charles Borchini, former commander of the joint PSYOP task force during Operation Restore Hope, the focus of psychological efforts during the UNITAF phase of the operations was "to facilitate the flow of information between Somalis and the organizations responsible for implementing the humanitarian mission of Operation Restore Hope" [Ref. 47]. While the PSYOP task force was instrumental in facilitating communications between the US envoy, US agencies, non-governmental organizations and the Somali people, joint planning with other agencies involved in the communications efforts were less deliberate and often the result of ad hoc coordination arranged through the professional initiative of operators on the ground. According to Cynthia Efird, USIA, DOD and USAID officers decided informally to coordinate information themes and activities to be used in Somalia. In their paper prepared for the National Defense University, Cynthia Efird and Carl Sahlin note that these impromptu meetings prevented USAID from presenting a message, which threatened force to those who might interfere with attempts to feed the Somalis.

USAID was seriously considering preparing and posting handbills showing Rambo threatening those who interfered with feeding. It was only with difficulty that USIA and DOD stopped this campaign which could have had the effect of "challenging" Somali clansmen to fight it out with Americans. [Ref. 48]

Instead, the Commander of Marine Forces in Somalia, Major General Charles Wilhelm, has credited PSYOP efforts with having reduced unnecessary bloodshed by convincing the Somalis

to cooperate rather than fight. General Wilhelm labeled the success of the PSYOP teams as a "combat subtractor." [Ref. 49]

Despite the best attempts of the officers on the ground, efforts at cooperation remained ad hoc and inconsistent. Coordination between USIA and DOD was evident in expanding the content of RAJO, the PSYOP published newspaper (Rajo is the Somali word for "hope"). Published daily, RAJO initially focused on military operations to secure Mogadishu and other major towns as well as the humanitarian relief to famine areas. The USIA's Frank Strovas arranged for the agency's daily Wireless File to be provided to the PSYOP task force enabling RAJO to carry more in-depth news about US policies. Strovas' aim was to appeal to the more educated Somalis who were beginning to reemerge from their war inflicted isolation.

While coordination was ongoing to improve the newspaper and facilitate the interagency information effort, a "rice-bowl" mentality and turf struggle was occurring at the newspaper's electronic counterpart, Radio RAJO. USIA's Voice of America was originally broadcasting only into Mogadishu and for just 30 minutes each day. The PSYOP medium-wave frequency within Mogadishu, on the other hand, reached most of Somalia. According to Efird, VOA forbade Radio Rajo from using any of its programming at any time claiming its credibility would suffer by having its programming carried on the military "propaganda" station. However, Efird points out that the prohibition continued even after the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II when Radio Rajo became a UN operation. In their paper, Efird and Sahlin note that "VOA's sensitivity is particularly difficult to understand since it is willing to place its programming on almost any foreign radio station, including stations run by foreign governmental entities" [Ref. 50].

The operational information campaign (there was no coordinated strategic campaign) also suffered from technological incompatibilities. Because all the key players in the information effort were not collocated, coordination problems were exacerbated when security requirements impeded the movement of USIA officers. By February 1993, heightened security concerns prevented USIA officers from traveling the several blocks to the PSYOP offices without an escort. Since the capability for text transmission between the two offices did not exist, the ability to physically carry text was effected by the heightened security thus inhibiting their efforts to coordinate operations. Efird and Sahlin point out that at these times, coordination was more crucial than ever.

It was however, precisely when physical security was most difficult that political input into RAJO was most important. RAJO became more controversial as conflicts between the UNITAF forces and Warlord General Aideed, who controlled the former Radio Mogadishu and a local paper, spilled over into the airwaves and newsprint. [Ref. 51]

Any success achieved in the information campaign during the UNITAF phase was ad hoc and lacking any strategically coordinated guidance. It resulted from the dedication of concerned professionals on the ground. Nevertheless, General Johnston credits PSYOP with convincing the various factions that the US military entered Somalia to take care of and assist all Somalis. Unfortunately, the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II resulted in even less coordination of the communications effort and the unraveling of much of the gains made during UNITAF.

For many reasons, UNOSOM II became a political disaster. Not the least of the reasons was the change in mission from humanitarian assistance to "nation-building" and seeking the arrest of Aideed. As US Army PSYOP personnel began to pull out of Somalia, the UN was slow to deploy its capabilities and assume the mission. Personnel turbulence was compounded at USIA



where shortages were slow to be filled. Nation-wide radio capabilities, first raised as a critical capability during UNITAF, were allowed to wither. Strategic guidance, now the sole responsibility of New York, was non-existent. Any information strategy on the ground was ineffective without the input and consent of the UNOSOM II civilian leadership. Additionally, any information campaign would have required an almost fresh start since the mission of UNOSOM II had drastically changed from that of UNITAF.

### **C. HAITI**

In October of 1993 plans had been developed to deploy a Military Information Support Team (MIST) in support of the UN sanctioned Joint Task Force Haiti. Scheduled to arrive in advance of the UN Joint Task Force, the MIST had devised an information campaign to address three key audiences on the island: the military, the police and the people. The MIST's goal was to convince the military of the benefits of professionalism, educate the police on the advantages of severing ties to the military, and to convince the Haitian people to voluntarily participate in the democratic process. The MIST was prepared to enact a comprehensive campaign using both print and electronic media and highlighting task force support to civic action projects.

According to Colonel Jeffrey Jones, former Commanding Officer of the US Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne),

The deployment of PSYOP personnel was delayed first by the US Country Team in Port-au-Prince and later by the office of the Secretary of Defense. Their reluctance stemmed partly from a concern that "psychological operations" would be perceived negatively both by the international press and by Haitians. Terminology changes were debated and it was eventually decided that the team would be referred to as public awareness liaison, or PAL. [Ref. 52]

The delay of the PSYOP personnel enabled the forces of President Aristide's opponents to seize the initiative in the information campaign for the minds of the Haitian people. When the USS

Harlan County was prevented from docking in Port-au-Prince, an international audience witnessed thugs wielding signs which threatened to turn Haiti into "another Somalia" (the world had recently witnessed the death of US soldiers in Somalia and their bodies dragged through the streets).

With the tacit endorsement of President Aristide, the US Departments of Defense and State began coordinated planning for a military intervention in Haiti in January of 1994. Having learned lessons from previous operations, the planners realized the value of interagency coordination for an effective, focused information campaign. Accordingly, in June of 1994, a MIST was deployed from the 4th Psychological Operations Group's home-base in North Carolina to Washington, D.C. The MIST coordinated with representatives from DOD, Department of State, the National Security Council, USIA and others to develop an information campaign to support the return of Aristide's government to Haiti.

The initial goals of the information campaign were to stem the tide of the Haitian exodus to the United States and to help restore the democratically elected government of President Aristide. Additionally, the campaign had to mitigate the misinformation and disinformation which had been spread by the military regime on the island. Accordingly, one of the earliest steps was the establishment of two radio stations.

Radio Democracy, an FM broadcast, was a conduit for the messages of President Aristide while Radio AM 940 was focused at dissuading Haitians from attempting to flee the island. This second station stressed the dangers of the seas, sharks, inclement weather and unsafe boats. In order to augment their capabilities towards reaching their target audience, 10,000 radios were

airdropped into Haiti to facilitate the expansion of their listening audience. Following the announcement of a change in US immigration policy on 5 July, the Haitian refugee tide ceased.

On the FM bands, Radio democracy aired messages from exiled President Aristide as well as discussions conducted by Haitian political experts. Stressing the benefits which democracy would bring to the island, the broadcasts stressed that violent retribution against the military regime was not in the interests of the President nor the restoration of democracy. Additionally, institutional messages recalled US involvement in Haiti highlighting past, present and future aid programs and similar US/UN programs worldwide. Because early planning still entailed a possible forcible entry, the information campaign was used to "prepare the battlefield" by attempting to nurture support for US policies. The campaign

sought to demonstrate US resolve, set the conditions for the introduction of forces, explain objectives, publicize success, reduce resistance, support law and order, protect citizens, reduce Haitian-on-Haitian violence, facilitate the return of the legitimate government, support civil military operations, increase the effectiveness of the new public security forces, and eventually ease the transition from a US-led endeavor to a United Nations mission. [Ref. 53]

To accomplish this multifaceted mission required coordination from all the agencies involved in the redemocratization of Haiti.

The job of coordinating the efforts of all the information operators fell to the interagency Information Coordinating Committee (ICC). In addition to those agencies involved with the MIST, the ICC also included public affairs and civil affairs officials, International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program and the International Police Monitors. Information Coordinating Committees were established at the national and Joint Task Force levels. The Washington-based, NSC-led Interagency Working Group enabled the United States to speak with one voice throughout the entire operation. Additionally, PSYOP was present at all

Joint Operations Planning Group meetings held by the US Atlantic Command. On the island, the Information Coordinating Committee was headed by USIS Director Stan Shrager. This committee included representative from USAID, the Joint Information Bureau, Disaster Relief Team, and the Department of Justice Police Training Team. This committee formulated a weekly agenda with key events highlighted for the morning press conferences. The ICC was also instrumental in transitioning the support which had been garnered for US forces to the Multinational Force. From the beginning, plans developed for the information campaign included both permissive and non-permissive environments, as well as the transition to the Multinational Force and the withdrawal of American forces.

## **V. CONCLUSION**

### **A. A TOOL OF DETERRENCE**

The information war is an on-going endeavor. It is not relegated to the period of armed conflict, but rather spans the time from pre-conflict to post-conflict diplomacy. It is also the key element in most Operations-Other-Than-War. These operations revolve around attempts to win hearts and minds by manipulating perceptions. Accordingly, it must be emphasized that the information war is not restricted to the "bells and whistles" of technological innovations, but also includes the perceptions of the messages transmitted by the activities of the Department of State, the US Information Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency and other government and non-government agencies and Private Volunteer Organizations. Our ability to use information will determine whether potential adversaries accept the credibility of our power.

The information war is not bounded by borders. In the strictest sense, it is a World War. Information targeted at an adversary will spread and be received by allies and neutrals not involved in the conflict. It will be picked up by civilian media and appear in the home territory to be disseminated among the home populace, affecting domestic opinion and support for or against military action. An information campaign must account for both worldwide and domestic consumption of the messages developed.

Foreign perceptions about US capabilities and intentions are central to our deterrence posture. An effective, coordinated strategic campaign can help preclude escalation during a crisis. How we articulate our goals and objectives will determine whether a potential adversary elects to challenge our capabilities to defend ourselves and our commitment to the defense of our allies. If deterrence fails, coordinated, strategic political communications become important adjuncts to

combat power. Information operations can confuse and confound adversarial decision-makers about US intentions, shore up coalitions, deceive opposition military forces, and discourage external support to the opposition while garnering support for US forces and our allies. These can be achieved by harnessing every asset of national power to contribute to the strategic political communications campaign.

Political maneuvering, diplomatic action, public diplomacy, economic strategies, cultural appeal, ideology, and military power - and the media and methods by which these strengths can be brought to bear - are all potential contributors to achieving national goals. [Ref. 54]

## **B. MANAGING THE MESSAGE**

Former Central Intelligence Agency Officer Donald Jameson relates the story of his experience with Soviet defector, Alexander Kaznacheyev. During the early sixties, Jameson reports that Kaznacheyev kept asking where in the United States it was all "put together." He continually inquired about the office or agency "where they coordinate diplomacy, the military, the trade policies, the propaganda?" When Jameson would respond that there was no such place, the defector understood his response to mean that the existence of such an operation was so sensitive that Jameson could not talk about it. Jameson writes that it took three years to convince Kaznacheyev that no such place existed. [Ref. 55]

The 1994 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement describes a US security policy objective to engage other nations and people. To pursue this national objective requires the ability to influence other peoples' perceptions. The ability to manage the power of information requires that it must be accepted as a vital national security issue. Effectively managing information will serve to defend and promote national interests. In writing of the lessons learned from the US involvement in Somalia, Kenneth Allard noted that any mission

must begin with strategy that focuses on long-term interests, to include transitioning to the post-crisis phase. The dissemination of information is too important to be left to ad hoc coordination by actors with differing motivations. A permanent interagency working group could serve to monitor issues before they become crises. As information flows up to the National Command Authority, an permanent Interagency Coordinating Committee can filter the noise out of the message traffic to help decision-makers focus on the critical issues. Granted the appropriate authority, this committee could communicate clear, concise information policy down to all agencies once policy decisions have been reached. More importantly, the committee could avoid the bureaucratic muddle usually encountered during ad hoc coordination.

The US needs an information strategy coordinated to the degree that our political strategy is coordinated by the Department of State, our economic strategy is coordinated by the National Economic Council, and the National Military Strategy is coordinated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A National Information Strategy would set objectives and provide guidance on executing a strategic information campaign plan. It would serve as an integrating mechanism for the political, economic and military strategies already articulated in the National Security Strategy. By integrating programs, capabilities and authorities of the various agencies, it would reduce duplication of effort thus saving taxpayer dollars. Such codified coordination is also long overdue. Former member of the National Security Council Staff, Carnes Lord, has written that

...there is a connection between the inadequacy of US psychological-political warfare efforts in the past and the inadequacy of strategic planning and decisionmaking at the national level ... this arena requires fully integrated planning and coordinated operations throughout virtually the entire national security bureaucracy. This coordination has always proven difficult for the US government, given the nature of presidential politics and the historically weak institutional structures of the White House and the National Security Council (NSC) system.... it is not surprising that it has not received sustained political support at the highest levels of the government. [Ref. 56]

### **C. RECOMMENDATIONS**

A permanent interagency committee must be re-established to devise, coordinate and implement a national information strategy. This committee can be modeled on the structure established by National Security Decision Directive #77 under President Reagan. Unlike the agency established under Reagan, however, the new committee must include the Central Intelligence Agency. The national intelligence apparatus must be included not only because of its role in the execution of an information strategy, but also because of the intelligence support necessary to properly conduct target audience analysis and their regional and local expertise of potential target nations. Additionally, this new coordinating committee must meet regularly to oversee the planning and execution of the national information strategy as well as any ongoing information operations undertaken in pursuit of national objectives. Lastly, it must have its authority to implement and direct national policy pertaining to information management codified by a new presidential directive. Given these requirements, the rational locus of such an agency is as one of the committees of the National Security Council. NSC leadership would apply the appropriate weight and prestige to issues pertaining to information management.

Membership in the information coordination committee would logically include those agencies directly involved in implementing an information campaign. The Department of State, US Information Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigations should be permanently represented on the committee. The sitting administration would be represented for policy matters by a representative from the National Security Advisor, preferably an appointee with experience in persuasive communications. Other agencies may be represented when matters



pertain to issues under their purview, as can Nongovernmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations when coordination would facilitate operations in regions of the world where they are currently operating. Additionally, US government agencies should establish positions for liaison from other agencies dedicated to information responsibilities. These liaisons will facilitate interagency communications and eventually spread knowledge and experience of information management throughout all national security agencies.

An information coordination committee would be tasked to develop, annually, the National Information Strategy in conjunction with the development of the National Security Strategy. An information strategy would be based on the current goals interests, and objectives established by the National Security Strategy. During a crisis, the committee would provide specific guidance on the objectives of an information campaign designed to accompany the political objectives established by the National Command Authority. With an understanding of the role and power of information, in particular the knowledge of creating messages specifically for the targeted audience, the committee could provide the framework for an information campaign specifically targeted to the political-military situation at hand. Such an information plan would aim to encourage allies to support the US position, discourage assistance to the current adversary, and encourage neutrals to remain neutral. During non-crisis periods, the committee could develop information campaigns to support the US posture on other standing transnational issues. Such issue may include, refugee flows, transnational economics, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights issues, sustaining alliances and counter-narcotics operations. Lastly, the committee could serve as the focal point for implementing emerging technological advances in communications into national security plans.

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